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The law of European Union’s (EU) diplomacy is not unitary. Entering into alliances, 
concluding trade deals, and nominating ambassadors are examples of activities traditionally 
seen as part of the undivided craft of diplomacy. Not so for the EU, whose external relations 
law draws a peculiar distinction. On one hand there is the general Union competence to 
engage in ‘external action’;1 on the other, there is the distinctive competence to conduct a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which is ‘subject to specific rules and 
procedures’.2 The differences in objectives, scope, and nature between the external relation 
competences is not specified in the Treaties and defies easy categorisation. There is only an 
unhelpful definition of CFSP: it shall cover ‘all areas of foreign policy and all questions 
relating to the Union's security’.3 The other competences are never defined  as a whole.4 This 
Article analyses whether EU institutions have used the general objectives of Union external 
action listed in Article 21(2) Treaty on the European Union (TEU) to pursue CFSP, or to 
pursue other external relations policies.  
 
Previous research has taken issue with this peculiar distinction in EU external relations law. 
Professor Alan Dashwood labelled it the ‘bipolarity of EU external action’,5 while Professor 
Wessel has maintained that the distinction is not as prominent as has been represented - for 
example in political speech - and that it is in any case fading away.6 The existence and 
retention of the split in EU law derives from historical developments, but institutional 
practice would seem to prove it arbitrary, or obsolete. Cooperation on foreign policy, 
although not part of the original Treaties establishing the European Community, developed 
informally in the Seventies and Eighties.7 It was later brought under EU Law8 retaining, 
however, its distinctive character.9  
 
                                                     
The author is grateful to Professor Takis Tridimas for the insightful discussion and suggestions, and to Professor 
Panos Koutrakos and the anonymous reviewers for their comments.  
1 Mostly regulated in Part Five of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This 
encompasses a number of competences but will be referred to, collectively, in the rest of this article as the 
“TFEU competence”. 
2 Article 24 Treaty on the European Union, TEU. CFSP decision-making mostly follows the unanimity rule in 
the Council. The Parliament plays hardly any role and the adoption of legislative acts is excluded. On the 
‘distinctiveness’ of CFSP see R.A. Wessel, The European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. A Legal 
Institutional Perspective (Kluwer Law 1999); more recently, Opinion of AG Wahl in ECJ 19 July 2016, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:212, H v Council of the European Union, paras. 38 and 45, and other works mentioned 
throughout the article. 
3 Article 24 TEU. Emphasis added. 
4 They are defined singulatim, one by one. The phrase “external action” is used in Chapter 1 of Title V TEU and 
in Part V of the TFEU to list all external relations competences including CFSP. Article 2 TFEU divides all EU 
competences into five categories: exclusive, shared, coordinating and supporting, coordinating and 
supplementing, and CFSP.  
5 A. Dashwood, “The Continuing Bipolarity of EU External Action” in I. Govaere et al (eds), The European 
Union in the World: Essays in Honour of Marc Maresceau (Leiden: Nijhoff 2013), p. 1. 
6 R.A. Wessel, ‘The Dynamics of the European Union Legal Order: An Increasingly Coherent Framework of 
Action and Interpretation,’ EuConst (2009) 1, p. 117; R.A. Wessel, “Lex Imperfecta: Law and Integration in 
European Foreign and Security Policy”, 2 European Papers: A Journal on Law and Integration (2016) p. 439. 
7 Among many: T. Bickerton, European Integration. From Nation States to Member States. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press (2013). 
8 J Larik, Foreign Policy Objectives in European Constitutional Law (OUP 2016) 72. 
9 P.J. Cardwell, “On ‘Ring-Fencing’ the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the Legal Order of the 
European Union” Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly (2015) pp. 443-463.  
As a result of the split in external relations law, it is difficult to identify the correct procedure 
for the adoption of an act.10 The correctness of this procedure is key to EU constitutional 
architecture, given the ‘non-affectation’ clause of Article 40 TEU which establishes that 
CFSP and TFEU competences ‘are to be equally protected against each other’.11 But in the 
absence of precise boundaries, it is moot whether essential and diverse foreign policy 
activities – e.g. the prosecution of suspected terrorists, the conclusion of agreements on 
energy security, or the fight against immigrant smugglers – should be conducted under CFSP 
or under other competences.  
 
This article analyses EU institutional management  – with special focus on the Council and 
the Court – of the interaction between CFSP and other external action competences by 
mapping out how institutions have linked any given external relations policy to one of the 
objectives of Article 21(2) TEU, both in decision-making and in the case law subsequent to 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.12 In doing so, it also provides a legal perspective on 
the Union’s activity with regard to the most important foreign policy items on its agenda 
since 2009, such as the Arab uprisings, the armed conflict in Ukraine, or the Paris Agreement 
on climate change.  
 
The starting point of the analysis is the duty to choose a ‘legal basis’, i.e. an article of the 
Treaties that EU institutions must use when adopting a measure. The choice of legal basis 
depends on ‘the aim and content of the measure’, as established by the case law of the Court 
(‘centre of gravity test’).13 However, as far as the ‘aim’ is concerned, no distinction is made 
between CFSP and other external action objectives: they are all listed under Article 21(2) 
TEU, letters (a) through (h), in a chapter containing ‘general provisions on the Union’s 
external action’.14 EU acts do not refer specifically to any of the letters of Article 21(2), but 
generally employ wording similar or even identical to the applicable provision. Moreover, as 
far as ‘content’ is concerned, in practice it is often impossible to determine what the prevalent 
aim is of a foreign policy measure or of an international treaty.15  
 
This article is structured to mirror the list of eight objectives for EU external action contained 
in Article 21(2) TEU. It considers whether each objective has been used to adopt CFSP 
decisions, TFEU acts, or both. This way, it is also possible to explore how institutions have 
                                                     
10 The literature is extensive: see e.g. I. Govaere, “Multi-faceted Single Legal Personality and a Hidden 
Horizontal Pillar: EU External Relations Post-Lisbon”, 13 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies  
(2011) p. 87 at 112; B. Van Vooren, “The Small Arms Judgment in an Age of Constitutional Turmoil” 14(2) 
European Foreign Affairs Review (2009), p. 231; P. Van Elsuwege, “The Potential for Inter-Institutional 
Conflicts before the Court of Justice: Impact of the Lisbon Treaty” in M. Cremona and A. Thies (eds), The 
European Court of Justice and External Relations Law: Constitutional Challenges (Hart 2014); G. Butler, 
“Pinpointing the Appropriate Legal Basis for External Action” 6(2) European Journal of Risk Regulation 
(2015), p. 323.  
11 A. Dashwood, “Article 47 TEU and the relationship between first and second pillar competences”, in A. 
Dashwood and M. Maresceau, Law and Practice of EU External Relations (CUP 2008), p. 100. See also AG 
Bot opinions in ECJ 19 July 2012, Case C-130/10, European Parliament v Council Case ECLI:EU:C:2012:50 
para 9 and ECJ, 24 June 2014, Case C-658/11, European Parliament v Council ECLI:EU:C:2014:41, AG 
Opinion para 86; H. Merket, The EU Security-Development Nexus: Bridging the Legal Divide (Brill 2016) 264. 
12 The present analysis is ‘static’ in the sense that it does not discuss trends or possible future variations in 
institutional behaviour. Moreover, it is not a quantitative treatment of institutional behaviour. These may be 
avenues for future research.   
13 On which, see the discussion in section 1 below and footnote 22.  
14 They are also scattered throughout the Treaties: Article 8 TEU specifies the objective on the EU in its 
neighbourhood; specific articles in the TFEU refer to other policies.  
15 For example, see the case of the EU Association Agreement with Ukraine discussed infra in subsection 6. 
concretely chosen to distinguish between CFSP on the one hand, and other areas of decision-
making with CFSP implications on the other: neighbourhood policy, migration, fight against 
terrorism, common commercial policy, judicial cooperation, energy and climate diplomacy.  
 
While acknowledging the historical reasons that account for the genesis of the split, this 
article defends the thesis that the distinction between CFSP and other areas of external action 
is neither semantically nor practically tenable. Semantically untenable since if CFSP covers 
‘all areas of foreign policy’16 there should be no other areas of foreign policy left, making the 
TFEU competences redundant. The argument that the Treaties distinguish between ‘foreign 
policy’ and ‘external action’ is hardly persuasive: these are perfect synonyms and the Treaties 
seem to use the phrases interchangeably.17 A possible solution would be to try to redefine the 
scope of CFSP, narrow it down, so as to encompass only the purely political and security 
aspects of foreign policy.18 In diplomatic practice, however, there is no distinction between 
‘political’ and ‘non-political’ international relations,19 as the article shows with particular 
reference to the conflation of CFSP and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.  
 
Nature of the objectives of Article 21(2) TEU 
 
Article 21(2) TEU reads:  
‘The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a 
high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to:  
(a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity;  
(b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the 
principles of inter national law;  
(c)  preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the 
principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, 
including those relating to external borders;  
(d)  foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of 
developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty;  
(e)  encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including 
through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade;  
(f)  help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the 
environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to 
ensure sustainable development;  
(g)  assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made 
disasters; and  
(h)  promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and 
good global governance.’ 
 
                                                     
16 Article 24 TEU. 
17 Considering that the institutional figure who conducts CFSP is called the High Representative for the Union 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Article 18 TEU), the phrases foreign policy, foreign affairs, external 
action, or international relations are used interchangeably in this article. 
18 According to Dashwood, CFSP consists of the ‘political, security and defence aspects’ of foreign policy. 
Dashwood, supra n. 5, p. 3. 
19 If it is even possible to define what is ‘political’. If taken to the extreme, the argument leads to the conclusion 
that the presence of a political element in all areas must imply that all EU internal competences are the same. 
However, arbitrary distinctions matter ‘less’ in internal competences: it is in the external sphere that, due to the  
‘third country’ element, mistakes are harder to correct. 
This was an innovation introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in clarification of the previous texts 
which foresaw specific CFSP objectives.20 All external action objectives were deliberately 
brought under the umbrella of Article 21 TEU to enhance the coherence and consistency of 
EU external relations.21  
For this reason, it can remain moot whether certain objectives of Article 21(2) relate 
exclusively to CFSP. Arguably, the most logical outcome of the introduction of the general 
objectives in Article 21(2) may be precisely that all objectives can be linked to all policies; 
this is indeed a finding of this contribution. However, with a view to fostering legal certainty 
and simplifying procedures, Advocates General and scholars have attempted to rationalise 
this uncertainty by proposing that the objectives be classified. AG Bot has for example taken 
the view that objectives (a) through (c) should be ‘assigned to’ CFSP22; this is supported by 
the fact that those are CFSP-specific objectives that had already appeared in the previous 
version of the Treaty on the European Union (in Article 11). In his opinion in a later case, 
however, the same Advocate General also included letter (h) as a CFSP objective.23 Professor 
Eeckhout instead regards only letter (c) as being undoubtedly a CFSP objective – and regards 
(d) through (g) as decidedly TFEU competences, with (a), (b) and (h) being of a cross-
sectoral nature.24 Professor Van Elsuwege has suggested that letters (a) through (c) imply that 
CFSP rules must be followed.25 Finally, Professor Koutrakos excludes the economic and 
social objectives in Article 21(2) from being covered by CFSP.26 As detailed in the rest of 
this article, the Court has not conclusively determined which if any of the eight objectives 
listed in Article 21(2) TEU fall under CFSP. Since EU acts usually do not make any 
reference to a specific letter of Article 21(2) TEU, the Court usually applies the traditional 
‘centre of gravity’ test to decide the correct legal basis of an act on a case by case basis.27  
As shown below, even though acts do not usually refer to specific letters directly, institutions 
have used the wording of letters (a), (b), (c), (d), (g) and (h) for CFSP measures, whereas all 
the objectives have been used for TFEU measures. While all eight objectives are equally 
important on paper, it is here submitted that letter (a) which reads ‘safeguard its values, 
fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity’ should be considered 
hierarchically superior. This is because all Union action28 must be carried out to safeguard its 
values, interests, security, independence and integrity. Security, integrity, and independence 
                                                     
20 R. Gosalbo-Bono, ‘Some Reflections on the CFSP Legal Order’, 43 Common Market Law Review (2006) 
p. 337. 
21 B. Van Vooren, “The Small Arms Judgment in an Age of Constitutional Turmoil” 14(2) European Foreign 
Affairs Review (2009) 245. 
22 Case C-130/10 AG Opinion para 63. Similarly, J. Larik, supra n 8, 215. 
23 Case C-658/11 para 87. 
24 P. Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (Oxford: OUP 2013), p. 169. 
25 P. Van Elsuwege, supra n. 27, p. 1006. 
26 P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Oxford: Hart 2015), p. 420. 
27 See e.g. ECJ, 14 June 2016, Case C-263/14 Parliament v Council ECLI:EU:C:2016:435 para 44. On the 
problems of this test, P. Van Elsuwege, “EU external action after the collapse of the pillar structure: in search of 
a new balance between delimitation and consistency” 47 C.M.L. Rev. (2010), p. 987 at 1004; and P. Koutrakos, 
The Common Security and Defence Policy (Oxford: OUP 2013), p. 242. The Court has held that recourse to a 
dual legal basis is not possible where the procedures laid down for each legal basis are incompatible with each 
other, see paragraphs 17 to 21 of ECJ, 11 June 1991, Case-300/89, Commission v Council (‘Titanium dioxide’) 
[1991] ECR I‑2867; see also Case C-130/10 para 45. AG Mengozzi in ECJ, 20 May 2008, Case C-91/05, 
Commission v Council ECOWAS ECLI:EU:C:2008:288, para 176 excluded recourse to a dual legal basis 
implying two different voting rules. The opposite conclusion was reached by AG Bot at paras 33 and 39 of his 
opinion in C-658/11. In its grand chamber judgment, as well as in case C-263/14, the Court did not decide 
directly on the points raised by the AG; therefore it has still not yet been explicitly ruled out whether it is 
possible to adopt a decision on a substantive dual legal basis.  
28 Including internal competences. 
are indeed existential requirements without which the conferral of a competence by the 
Member States for the attainment of a common objective (Article 1 TEU), and therefore the 
functioning of the EU itself, would not be possible. As far as values and interests are 
concerned, clearly the European Union does not purse either external or internal policies that 
go against its fundamental interests.29  
The other objectives of Union external action are essentially aspects of the general clause of 
letter (a); strictly speaking, the others are redundant. This is especially the case since the text 
of (a) is vague enough to ensure flexibility yet sufficiently concrete to be meaningful; the 
generic terms ‘values’ and ‘security’ are further defined in Articles 2 and 42(1) TEU;30 
integrity should be considered to be a factual determination and only relatively debatable; 
‘independence’ and ‘fundamental interests’ are open-ended provisions which can be adapted 
over time to  conform to varying political scenarios and the vagaries of public opinion.  
Article 21(2) TEU, Letter (a): Safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, 
independence and integrity  
Letter (a) is an all-encompassing clause that covers all other objectives of the Union’s 
external action. However, institutions do not treat it as a general clause, nor as hierarchically 
superior. Most authors agree that the wording of letter (a) may be used for CFSP measures31 
– and indeed since CFSP comprises security and defence (this is one of the few things we 
know for sure) it is hard to see how safeguarding the Union’s security, independence, and 
integrity would not be part of that policy.  
The wording of letter (a) is nonetheless used for TFEU competences. In the Front Polisario 
case,32 the applicants challenged the validity of a Common Commercial Policy (CCP) 
Council Decision to conclude an agreement between the EU and Morocco insofar as, they 
submitted, the agreement applied to the disputed territory of Western Sahara.33 In one of their 
pleas, the applicants relied on Article 21(2) TEU and submitted that the agreement was 
contrary to the Union’s values because the EU would have disregarded, in concluding the 
Treaty, UN resolutions and international law. 
The General Court, though, had no qualms about linking diplomatic ‘economic relations’ to 
the values of Article 21(2)(a) TEU. Rejecting the applicant’s plea, it stated that  
‘According to the case-law, the EU institutions enjoy a wide discretion in the field of 
external economic relations which covers the agreement (…). Consequently, it cannot 
be accepted that it follows from the ‘values on which the European Union is based’, 
                                                     
29 For this reason, Article 7 TEU establishes a system for ensuring Member State compliance with EU 
fundamental values.  
30 Security is further defined in Article 43(1). J. Schmidt, “Common Foreign and Security Policy and European 
Security and Defence Policy after Lisbon: Old Problems Solved?” 5 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and 
Policy (2009), p. 240. 
31 Eeckhout, supra n. 24, p. 169; Van Elsuwege, supra n. 27, p. 1006; Koutrakos, supra n. 26, p. 420. 
32 ECJ, 13 March 2014, Case C-512/12, Front Polisario v Council ECLI:EU:T:2015:953. 
33 Council Decision 2012/497/EU of 8 March 2012 on the conclusion of an Agreement in the form of an 
Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco concerning reciprocal 
liberalisation measures on agricultural products, processed agricultural products, fish and fishery products, the 
replacement of Protocols 1, 2 and 3 and their Annexes and amendments to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement 
establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and 
the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part.  
or the provisions relied on by the Front Polisario in the present plea [inter quas 
Article 21(2)], that the conclusion by the Council of an agreement with a third State 
which may be applied in a disputed territory is, in all cases, prohibited.’34  
Moreover, issues of ‘energy security’ (steadiness of supply and acquisition from safe and 
sustainable sources) are managed using a TFEU legal basis (Article 194(2) TFEU).35 An 
example is the ‘Gas Security’ Regulation, whose aim, in light of EU dependence on import in 
this sector, is to improve the Union’s response to supply shortages.36 While the EU pursues 
the security of its gas supply by decreasing dependence on third countries, thereby increasing 
its independence,37 the issues are never treated as a CFSP competence. For example, since 
2009 only three of the nineteen non-binding agreements mentioning energy that have been 
concluded by the EU with third countries were signed or co-signed by the High 
Representative for the Union Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.38  
Letter (b): Consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the 
principles of international law  
 
Cases that involve support for democracy in non-EU countries that have been decided by the 
General Court in the context of the review of restrictive measures can help to illustrate that 
the Court and the Council agree that the wording of letter (b) is a CFSP objective.39  
 
In Al Matri,40 the applicant had challenged restrictive measures adopted by the Council. In 
reaction to the political turmoil in Tunisia and with the aim of supporting democracy in that 
country, in the spring of 2011 the EU imposed sanction on individuals  
‘responsible for misappropriation of Tunisian State funds and who are thus depriving 
the Tunisian people of the benefits of the sustainable development of their economy 
and society and undermining the development of democracy in the country’.41  
One of the applicant’s legal pleas had been that he lacked the criteria to be included on the 
list of people subject to the sanction. The Court instead held that the Council had been precise 
in formulating the criteria, i.e. persons responsible for the ‘misappropriation of Tunisian State 
funds’ (Article 1 Decision 2011/72). The General Court also noted that the wording of that 
provision was ‘perfectly consistent with the Council’s objectives.’ It was evident from the 
recitals in the preamble to Decision 2011/72, the Court went on to state,  
‘that that decision is intended to support the efforts of the Tunisian people to establish 
a ‘stable democracy’, while helping them to enjoy the ‘benefits of the sustainable 
                                                     
34 Para 165. The final outcome of the case was nonetheless the annulment of the agreement insofar as it 
extended to Western Sahara, but on appeal the Court of Justice reversed the judgment because it found that the 
agreement did not apply to Western Sahara. 
35 Following the European Commission’s adoption in February 2015 of a ‘Framework Strategy for a Resilient 
Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy’, a new Gas Regulation was proposed in 2016 
(Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning measures to safeguard the 
security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010). 
36 Regulation 994/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 concerning measures 
to safeguard security of gas supply and repealing Council Directive 2004/67/EC, 5th Recital. 
37 The European Union Energy Security Strategy of 2014 warns that “[t]he most pressing energy security of 
supply issue is the strong dependence from a single external supplier”. 
38 The data are from B. Van Vooren and R. Wessel, EU External Relations Law (OUP 2014) for instruments up 
to 2014; the data after that date were calculated by the author. 
39 See also ECJ, 10 October 2014, Case T‑720/14, Rotenberg ECLI:EU:T:2016:689 para 176; and C-658/11 AG 
Opinion para 119. 
40 GC, 28 May 2013, Case T-200/11, Al Matri ECLI:EU:T:2013:275. 
41 Second recital of Decision 2011/72/CFSP, with a similar formulation in Article 1 thereof.  
development of their economy and society. Such objectives, which are among those 
referred to in Article 21(2)(b) and (d) TEU, are designed to be achieved by a freezing 
of assets the scope of which is, as in this instance, restricted to those responsible’ for 
misappropriation of ‘Tunisian State funds’ and their associates, that is to say, to the 
persons whose actions are liable to have jeopardised the proper functioning of 
Tunisian public institutions and bodies linked to them’ (par 46).42 
 
Ben Ali43 was another case stemming from the measures contested in Al Matri and adopted 
against individuals suspected of money laundering in view of the ‘situation in Tunisia’. 
Again, the General Court held that the measures were compatible with the objectives of 
letters (b) and (d) insofar as the sanctions were aimed at supporting Tunisian democracy and 
were targeted at individuals being prosecuted by the Tunisian authorities (par 62).  
 
In Tomana,44 the applicants had challenged the competence of the Council to adopt, on a 
CFSP legal basis, Decisions 2011/101 and 2012/97 against persons who were engaged in 
activities seriously undermining democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in 
Zimbabwe. The applicants acknowledged that supporting democracy, the rule of law and 
human rights (in addition to combating terrorism) were CFSP objectives but took issue with 
the Council and Commission competence to legislate criminal or civil law. The applicants 
submitted that those institutions enjoyed limited competence in that field – as set out in 
Articles 82 TFEU through 86 TFEU. Therefore, given the non-affectation clause of Article 
40 TEU, in their submission 
‘neither the Council nor the Commission has competence to use the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy in order to impose a freezing of funds or a travel ban on 
individuals simply on the basis that they are alleged to have been involved in the past 
in crimes or serious misconduct.’ (par 90).  
The General Court found that  
‘it is clear from a reading of Article 21 TEU in conjunction with Article 29 TEU (…), 
that the adoption of measures intended to advance, in the rest of the world and, 
consequently, in Zimbabwe, democracy, the rule of law, the universality and 
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, may be the subject of a 
decision based on Article 29 TEU’ (par 93)  
and referred to paragraph 46 of Al Matri. AG Bot’s Opinion in case C-658/11 arguably puts a 
finer point on the argument: CFSP, in particular CSDP, may ‘also contribute to the fight 
against other forms of crime [other than terrorism].’45  
The case law on restrictive measures adopted to foster the rule of law in Ukraine remains in 
line with previous jurisprudence. In Yanukovych, the applicant had argued that the CFSP 
sanction imposed upon him did not actually serve to pursue its declared CFSP objective 
because it had not been proved that the applicant had undermined democracy, the rule of law 
or human rights in Ukraine. The Court confirmed the validity of the CFSP after scrutinising 
the compatibility of the act with the ‘objectives of the CFSP stated in Article 21(2)(b) TEU’ – 
thereby acknowledging that the wording of letter (b) could be a CFSP objective.46 The link 
                                                     
42 See also, in the same context, GC, 28 May 2013, Case T‑187/11, Trabelsi ECLI:EU:T:2013:273 para 80; GC, 
30 June 2016, Case T-224/14, CW ECLI:EU:T:2016:375 para 69 and GC, 5 October 2017, Case T-165/15, 
Mabrouk ECLI:EU:T:2017:694 para 64.  
43 GC, 2 April 2014, Case T-133/12, Ben Ali CLI:EU:T:2014:176. 
44 GC, 22 April 2015, Case T-190/12, Tomana, ECLI:EU:T:2015:222. 
45 Par 103. 
46 GC, 19 July 2017, Case T-348/14, Yanukovych ECLI:EU:T:2016:508 para 88. 
between 21(2)(b) and CFSP was upheld in Yvanyushchenko,47 in which the Court stated that 
the objectives of CFSP ‘are defined, in particular, in Article 21(2)(b) TEU’ (par 68). The 
same wording was used in Klymenko,48 in which the General Court additionally provided a 
non-exhaustive list of principles and standards which may fall within the concept of ‘the rule 
of law’. Those principles  
‘include the principles of legality, legal certainty and the prohibition of arbitrary 
exercise of power by the executive, independent and impartial courts, effective 
judicial review including respect for fundamental rights, and equality before the law.’  
In Ipatau, the General Court added guarantees of fair and independent elections to the list.49 
All these principles, therefore, can be pursued validly through CFSP acts: for example, 
restrictive measures may be implemented to target individuals who have put any of the 
aforementioned aspects of the rule of law in peril.50  
Finally, in a plea before the Court in Case C-263/14 (discussed further below), the Council 
had argued that an international agreement whose sole purpose was the promotion of the rule 
of law and respect for human rights indeed pursued exclusively CFSP aims.51 
Institutions have interpreted the requirement of Article 21(2)(b) to mean that it does not 
matter where in the world democracy, the rule of law, and human rights are being fostered: 
the EU is still pursuing its CFSP regardless of where. This approach is perfectly in line with 
the wording of the TEU which does not place any regional limitations on the overall 
objective of EU external action. The objective of Article 21(2)(b) TEU is valid everywhere in 
the world. Indeed, as a matter of logic and consistency these objectives are also valid within 
the EU: Article 2 TEU states that the EU is founded on ‘the values of respect for human 
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights’ et cetera. 
The only meaningful alternative interpretation would have been to circumscribe these values 
to the EU and its immediate neighbours. While letter (b) is not limited in regional scope, the 
EU also has a specific foreign policy objective for its environs: Article 8(1) TEU.  
Letter (c): Preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the 
principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including 
those relating to external borders  
Article 21(2)(c) has been used many times by the Council explicitly to establish sanctions 
against the Islamic State and Al Qaeda,52 as well as for other instruments aimed at terrorism. 
                                                     
47 GC, 8 November 2017, Case T-246/15), Yvanyushchenko ECLI:EU:T:2017:789. 
48 GC, 8 November 2017, Case T-245/15 Klymenko para 69. 
49 GC, 23 September 2014, Case T-646/11 Ipatau ECLI:EU:T:2014:800. 
50 Other cases which reached the same conclusion are GC, Case T‑215/15 Azarov ECLI:EU:T:2017:479 para 83; 
GC, Case T‑221/15 Arbuzov ECLI:EU:T:2017:478 para 103;  
51 Case C-263/14 para 36. 
52 Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 of 20 September 2016 concerning restrictive measures against ISIL 
(Da'esh) and Al-Qaeda and persons, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them and repealing 
Common Position 2002/402/CFSP, 8th recital.  
In Case C-130/10,53 the European Parliament had challenged the Council’s adoption of a 
Regulation imposing sanctions against persons associated with Al Qaeda and the Taliban. 
The Regulation was adopted under a CFSP legal basis, but the Parliament submitted that it 
should have been adopted under Article 75, AFSJ. Following the Kadi judgments,54 the Court 
held that terrorism constituted a threat to international peace and security and therefore could 
be fought with CFSP measures – thus implying that the wording of letter (c) could be a CFSP 
objective. The same position was expressed by the Court in Rosneft, a case brought by a 
Russian company against measures imposed by the EU in light of the confrontation in 
Ukraine.55 In a consistent line of jurisprudence, the Court has acknowledged that the EU 
could adopt CFSP measures  
‘designed to protect essential European Union security interests and to maintain peace 
and international security, in accordance with the specified objective, under the first 
subparagraph of Article 21(1) and Article 21(2)(c) TEU, of the Union’s external 
action’.56 
But terrorism, under EU law, can be fought with CFSP and AFSJ measures. Examples of the 
latter are the Passenger Name Record Directive for the prevention, detection, investigation 
and prosecution of terrorism which provides for the transfer and processing of passenger data 
of flights to or from outside the EU,57 and the traceability of money transfers Regulation 
which sets rules on information regarding providers and recipients of funds in order to 
prevent, detect, and investigate terrorism financing.58 
What, then, is the criterion for distinguishing between AFSJ and CFSP? It is worth taking a 
closer look at the Opinion of AG Bot in Case C-130/10: acknowledging that letter (c) is a 
CFSP objective, he suggested that the fight against terrorism could be a CFSP competence.59 
The Advocate General admitted that the relationship between Article 75 TFEU and CFSP is 
one of complementarity in the fight against terrorism, and suggested a precise criterion to 
delimit the two competences: it is CFSP if the EU is acting pursuant to a decision of the UN 
Security Council60 or if it aids third states in combatting terrorism in their territory.61 Both 
criteria, however, have their flaws. The mere fact that the EU is acting pursuant to a Security 
Council decision cannot in itself determine the nature of an EU competence, absent any rule 
about it in the Treaties. Moreover, the difference between AFSJ and CFSP in the fight against 
                                                     
53 Case C-130/10. 
54 ECJ, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi ECLI:EU:C:2008:461; ECJ, Joined Cases C‑584/10 P, 
C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P Kadi II ECLI:EU:C:2013:518 para 103; Kadi II (Joined Cases C‑584/10 P, 
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55 Rosneft challenged the validity of certain provisions of Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP of 31 July 2014, 
concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 
L 229/13) and of Council Regulation (UE) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in 
view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 229/1).  
56 Par 112. See also GC, Case T‑255/15, Almaz Antey v Council ECLI:EU:T:2017:25 para 99; GC, Case T-
262/15 Kiselev ECLI:EU:T:2017:392 paras 58 and 81. Rotenberg para 176. 
57 Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the use of 
passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist 
offences and serious crime. 
58 Regulation (EU) 2015/847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on information 
accompanying transfers of funds and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006. 
59 Infra, subsection 8. 
60 See also Case C-658/11 AG Opinion par 114. 
61 Case C-130/10 AG Opinion, par 81. 
terrorism does not lie in the distinction between internal and external security. AG Bot 
himself wrote:  
‘I refuse to subscribe to the Council’s view that the delimitation of the respective 
spheres of application of Articles 75 TFEU and 215(2) TFEU should be based on a 
distinction between ‘internal’ terrorists, ‘external’ terrorists and ‘international’ 
terrorists. Such a categorisation is contrary to the very nature of terrorism, which, by 
attacking common values and the very foundations of the rule of law, affects the 
entire international community, irrespective of the geographical scale of the threat’.  
In other words, the distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ terrorism would run counter 
to common sense.  
In the judgment on the conclusion of a Treaty with Tanzania involving the interaction of 
CFSP with AFSJ, the ECJ confirmed that actions aimed at preserving international peace and 
security fell within CFSP.62 The case however warrants further analysis.   
The Agreement between the EU and Tanzania established the conditions of transfer to 
Tanzania of suspected pirates captured by the EU-led naval force. The European Parliament 
challenged the fact that the Council had concluded the Treaty on a CFSP legal basis. In the 
Parliament’s submission, the Agreement did not relate exclusively to CFSP; it had a twofold 
purpose in that it also touched upon the fields of judicial cooperation in criminal matters and 
police cooperation – or in other words, AFSJ. Accordingly, it could not be adopted on a 
substantive CFSP legal basis. The Council responded that the Agreement had been concluded 
in connection with a military crisis management operation (known as Operation Atalanta) 
that had been taken up pursuant to a UN Security Council resolution and that it did not 
concern the area of freedom, security and justice; it had as its sole aim the promotion of the 
rule of law and respect for human rights. The Court held that the fact that certain provisions 
of the Agreement, taken individually, had a certain affinity with AFSJ was not in itself 
sufficient to determine the appropriate legal basis. The aim of the Agreement, the Court 
found, was to establish a mechanism that was an essential element in the effective realisation 
of the objectives of Operation Atalanta, in particular since it strengthened, in a lasting way, 
international cooperation with respect to preventing acts of piracy (par 49). The aim of 
Operation Atalanta, and therefore of the Agreement intimately linked to it, was to preserve 
international peace and security: the pursuit of this objective lead the Court to conclude that 
the Agreement could be adopted by a CFSP decision (para 54).   
The areas of Freedom, Security and Justice and Common Foreign and Security Policy have, 
as the names imply, one common element: protecting security. This leaves a few questions 
unanswered, not to mention uncertainty about the nature of the EU’s competence to conduct 
migration policy. Even though  case C-263/14 concerned AFSJ in general and not migration 
in particular, AG Kokott suggested the following criterion for distinguishing CFSP from 
AFSJ, which may be extrapolated to cover migration: measures fall under CFSP if they are 
characterised as strengthening extra-EU security (the ‘international security’ of letter (c)); but 
are otherwise adopted on the TFEU legal basis of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
for matters of internal security or cooperation within the Union.63 The Court did not 
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63 “As the Council and the Kingdom of Sweden very rightly state, the crucial factor is that the relevant rules in 
Articles 82 TFEU and 87 TFEU deal only with cooperation within the Union. This can be seen, on the one hand, 
from a glance at the wording of the two provisions, but, on the other, it also follows from the concept of the area 
explicitly endorse this reasoning, but did follow the AG in the outcome of the decision. The 
Court’s avoidance of pronouncing on a definitive criterion for solving the issue of the 
boundaries between CFSP and AFSJ guarantees a degree of flexibility that may be 
diplomatically useful, but, given the current state of EU external relations law, is detrimental 
to legal certainty.  
In any case, AG Kokott’s distinction does not stand the test of institutional practice: 
cooperation on security within Union borders has also been pursued in regulating migration 
matters by CFSP acts.  
Graham Butler has analysed how CFSP has been stretched to encompass rules on 
migration.64 The Union has used CFSP to prevent individuals from entering its territory, for 
instance in the case of EU actions against Libya65 and Ukraine:66 the enacted sanctions 
banned certain individuals from travelling to the EU. The same author also noted that the EU 
response to the migration crisis has encompassed both CFSP and non-CFSP measures.67  
In the aforementioned cases – sanctions and military missions – CFSP was used to monitor 
who enters the Union because the objective and focus of the legal act was the pursuit of 
international security, not internal security – or so AG Kokott’s reasoning would demand. 
This explanation is, however, unconvincing. First, why would the seizure of vessels used for 
smuggling people in their attempt to reach an EU Member State not be a matter of EU 
internal security?68 Second, even if it were taken for granted that no matter of internal 
security was involved, EU institutions have been inconsistent in the use of the competences 
to pursue this objective. Although certain measures on migration have been based on CFSP, 
the border agency Frontex as well as the European Common Asylum System have instead 
been adopted on an AFSJ legal basis.  
Phenomenologically, there is no difference between intercepting people at sea under CFSP 
and doing it under the TFEU69: it certainly makes no difference to the persons being rescued. 
The differences lie exclusively in the procedure for the adoption of the act and other legal 
technicalities. But the distinction between CFSP and AFSJ is barely identifiable and cannot 
                                                                                                                                                                     
of freedom, security and justice, to the creation of which they contribute. It is the Union that provides its citizens 
with such an area and it is the Union that constitutes that area (Article 67(1) TFEU), with the emphasis on an 
area without internal frontiers (Article 3(2) TEU and 67(2) TFEU). By contrast, the contested decision — or the 
disputed agreement which it approves — does not regulate judicial or police cooperation within the Union. Nor 
does it affect or alter such cooperation in accordance with the last variant of Article 216(1) TFEU. Rather, 
contrary to the claim made by the Parliament and the Commission, the Member States’ power to prosecute 
international crimes like piracy is completely unaffected by the agreement. The sole subject of the agreement is 
cooperation with the authorities of Tanzania, a third State, and then only if the authorities of the Member States 
do not take on the prosecution themselves” Case C-263/14 AG Opinion paras 63-64 (emphasis in the original).  
64 G. Butler, “Forcing the law to overlap? EU foreign policy and other EU external relations in times of crisis”, 




67 Butler, supra n. 64. An example of a CFSP decision was Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 of 18 May 2015 
on a European Union Military Operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Med) OJ L 
122/31, establishing Operation Sophia.  
68 Articles 1(1) and 2(2) Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 (n 67). Applying the rationale proposed by AG Bot 
in Case C-658/11 AG Opinion 112, this is an AFSJ competence.   
69 Staying on the distinction between AFSJ and CFSP: “Of course, the distinction is not always clear as it is true 
that the development of a form of crime in a certain region may pose a threat to both the internal security of the 
Union and the stability of the region concerned.” Case C-658/11 AG Opinion 113.  
be rationalised and defined by a sound legal principle. In particular, while the issue of 
boundaries between CFSP and other external action competences is a recurrent one, the 
conflation of CFSP and AFSJ is clearer. 
(d) Foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of 
developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty 
In Al Matri, the General Court found that the EU decision to support the efforts of the 
Tunisian people to establish a ‘stable democracy’ while helping them to enjoy the ‘benefits of 
the sustainable development of their economy and society’ fell under letter (d) (as well as 
letter (b), as pointed out above).70  
In Ezz,71 the General Court agreed that a Council Decision establishing sanctions against 
certain Egyptian individuals had involved Articles 21(2)(b) and (d) and was therefore ‘fully 
based on CFSP’ (par 44). The objectives of that decisions were twofold: first,  
‘to support the peaceful and orderly transition to a civilian and democratic 
government in Egypt based on the rule of law, with full respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms’  
and, second, to support ‘efforts to create an economy which enhances social cohesion and 
promotes growth’.72 
Al Matri and Ezz are quoted as precedent in other cases of the General Court involving 
similar issues, such as Klyuyev73 and Yanukovych.74 
It would appear, therefore, that the wording of letter (d) is also a CFSP objective. It is not all 
that farfetched to link the eradication of poverty to international security, and therefore to EU 
security and defence policy. 
TFEU competences, however, use similar wording. Chapter One of Title Three of the TFEU 
provisions on Union external action is entirely dedicated to development cooperation – the 
ultimate objective of which is akin to letter (d): ‘Union development cooperation policy shall 
have as its primary objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty’ 
(Article 208(1) TFEU). Development cooperation, as Professor Koutrakos has noted, had 
featured prominently in the (former) EU Security Strategy of 2003,75 as do sustainable 
development goals in the 2016 Global Strategy.76 Moreover, there is a TFEU-based financing 
mechanism for CSDP missions: the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP),77 
previously known as the Instrument for Stability, which provides short and mid-term 
assistance for conflict prevention, crisis response and peace building actions around the 
                                                     
70 Para 46.  
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ECLI:EU:C:2015:147, paras 43-44.  
73 Klyuyev par 85. 
74 Yanukovych par 95. 
75 Koutrakos, supra n. 27, p. 212. 
76 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. 
The word ‘development’ appears sixty-seven times in the 48 pages of text.  
77 Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing 
an instrument contributing to stability and peace. 
world. Its Article 5 falls under the remit of the European Commission Department for 
International Cooperation and Development - EuropeAid. Activities linked to crisis 
management (Article 3) and peace building (Article 4) are managed by the service for 
Foreign Policy Instruments, thus implementing the CFSP budget.78  
The ‘centre of gravity’ test might be the appropriate criterion for managing the interaction 
between CFSP and development cooperation, as can be inferred from the Framework 
Agreement with the Philippines case79 – although the issue there involved the delimitation of 
development cooperation and AFSJ. In that case, the Court specified that Union action in 
development cooperation ‘is not limited to measures directly aimed at the eradication of 
poverty, but also pursues the objectives referred to in Article 21(2) TEU, such as the 
objective, set out in Article 21(2)(d), of fostering the sustainable economic, social and 
environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating 
poverty’ (par 37). The Court decided nonetheless that  
‘even if a measure contributes to the economic and social development of developing 
countries, it does not fall within development cooperation policy if it has as its main 
purpose the implementation of another policy’ (par 44).  
Moreover - and this is not an external action competence according to the Treaty - Articles 
198-203 TFEU authorise the EU to conclude agreements with overseas territories. The 
purpose of these association agreements  
‘shall be to promote the economic and social development of the countries and territories and 
to establish close economic relations between them and the Union as a whole’ (Article 198 
TFEU).80   
 (e) Encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including 
through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade  
While the wording of letter (e) has not been used for purely CFSP acts, it has certainly been 
used to conclude Treaties that bear significant political and security implications. A recent 
dramatic case was the renegotiation in 2014 of the association agreement concluded with 
Ukraine.81 In that case, economic integration was used instrumentally to pursue political 
dialogue.82 The inherently dual legal nature of the Association Agreement also emerged from 
the legal bases of the act. In addition to Article 217 TFEU (association agreements), these 
included Article 31 TEU and 37 TEU (both of which are CFSP legal bases).83  
The further aims of the association are, inter alia,  
                                                     
78 European Parliament, ‘Financing of CSDP missions and operations’ available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/577958/EPRS_ATA(2016)577958_EN.pdf 
79 ECJ, Case C‑377/12, Commission v Council ECLI:EU:C:2014:1903. 
80 See, e.g. Council Decision 2013/755/EU of 25 November 2013 on the association of the overseas countries 
and territories with the European Union.  
81 Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of 
the other part of 21 March 2014 OJ L161/3. 
82 See e.g. 6th recital of the Agreement. 
83 See also Article 7 of the Agreement. 
‘to promote, preserve and strengthen peace and stability in the regional and 
international dimensions in accordance with the principles of the United Nations 
Charter, and of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe and the objectives of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 
1990” (i.e. 21(2)(c)) and “to establish conditions for enhanced economic and trade 
relations leading towards Ukraine's gradual integration in the EU Internal Market, 
including by setting up a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area’ (i.e. 21(2)(e)).    
Letter (e) is therefore used to implement Common Commercial Policy (CCP), one objective 
of which is contribution to  
‘the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions 
on international trade and on foreign direct investment, and the lowering of customs 
and other barriers’ (Article 206 TFEU).  
 
The example of the association agreement with Ukraine raises the question of whether it is at 
all possible to tell the two objectives apart.84 That question becomes even more fraught with 
meaning given the subsequent developments in Ukraine. Even though it might still be too 
soon to apportion blame and draw up the historical balance, the political atmosphere in which 
the association agreement was negotiated later degenerated into tension between the EU and 
Russia and an armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The situation in fact posed a threat to, and 
then breached, international security. As a matter of law, it was tackled by the CFSP.85 
 
Procurement in the field of defence and security, which had traditionally been a domain of 
the Member States, has been regulated by Directive since 2009.86 Article 46 TFEU 
nonetheless importantly states that:  
‘any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the 
protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the 
production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material’ – albeit no distortion of 
competition shall ensue regarding products not intended for military purposes.  
 
More generally, the link between free trade and international security is a central tenet of 
both neo-liberalism and contemporary world politics.87 Cobden is credited with saying that 
‘Free trade is God’s diplomacy. There is no other certain way of uniting people in the bonds 
of peace’.88  
Another example of the interaction between CFSP and CCP is the regulation of trade in dual-
use goods, that is, products capable of being used for military as well as civilian purposes. In 
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87 T. Paine, Common Sense (1st ed 1776). See also Front Polisario, discussed under letter (a).  
88 Quoted in D. Tussie, “Trade Diplomacy” in Cooper, Heine, Thakur (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Modern 
Diplomacy (OUP 2013).  
two classic 1995 decisions, Werner89 and Leifer,90 the Court established that national 
measures restricting the export of dual-use goods must be compatible with the rules of the 
common commercial policy.91 Specifically, in Werner the Court stated that  
‘a measure (…) whose effect is to prevent or restrict the export of certain products, 
cannot be treated as falling outside the scope of the common commercial policy on 
the ground that it has foreign policy and security objectives’.  
The EU later repealed92 the previous dual-use goods control system, which had been based on 
both TFEU and CFSP instruments.93 And it did so in the firm conviction that, respecting the 
Court’s reasoning, no CFSP measure could regulate these goods.94 To date, the EU export 
control regime is governed by Regulation 2009/428/EC (with subsequent amendments 
adopted on a CCP legal basis). However, Professor Dashwood is right in arguing that the 
Court’s jurisprudence is not conclusive of the fact the Union enjoys an exclusive CCP 
competence to regulate the trade in dual-use goods: the cases at issue have instead simply 
restated that a Member State must respect the CCP even when it intends to further its CFSP 
aims.95 This is yet another instance of the problem of fragmented EU diplomacy: the case 
law, subsequent scholarly comments, and EU institutional practice merely bear witness to the 
fact that although foreign policy is in practice indivisible, it is carried out by various 
interrelated diplomatic means, some military, some economic, etc.  
(f) Help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the 
environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to 
ensure sustainable development 
This letter as well is amenable to the pursuit of both TFEU and ‘security’ objectives.  
The Paris Agreement was ratified by the EU pursuant to Article 192(1) TFEU,96 which refers 
to the objectives of Article 191 TFEU such as ‘preserving, protecting and improving the 
quality of the environment and (…) prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources’.  
However, energy policy is of course also pursued by means of  CFSP acts: the most 
outstanding example is probably the series of measures adopted pursuant to the ‘nuclear deal’ 
with Iran.97 As mentioned under letter (a), energy policy is subject to underlying geopolitical 
security concerns regarding EU energy dependence. A recent example of the fact that 
diplomacy is essentially a concerted endeavour is the newly launched Alliance for the Sahel, 
an initiative open to EU Member States for the assistance of countries in that African region. 
In the Strategy for Sahel, which was drafted by the European External Action Service (a body 
established pursuant to CFSP),98 the alliance has four inextricably linked objectives related to 
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Tridimas (eds), Continuity and Change in EU Law: Essays in Honour of Sir Francis Jacobs (OUP 2008). 
92 Regulation 1334/2000. 
93 More precisely, on the CFSP and the Treaty on the European Community. 
94 Dashwood 2008, supra n. 91, p. 357. 
95 Ibid, p. 358. 
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98 Council Decision 2010/427/EU establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action 
Service, OJ L 201/30. 
development and conflict resolution, politics, security, and the struggle against extremism. 
The fight against change is listed under ‘development and conflict resolution’.99  
(g) assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters 
 
Article 222 TFEU is a ‘solidarity clause’ which provides that if a Member State is  
‘the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man- made disaster, the 
other Member States shall assist it at the request of its political authorities’.  
Even though the clause is in the TFEU,100 and is similar to Article 196 TFEU, there are 
grounds for considering it in relation to CFSP competence.101 
The Council Decision implementing Article 222 was adopted under the TFEU,102 but at the 
initiative of a joint proposal presented by the High Representative and the Commission;103 the 
Council decides in accordance with Article 31(1) TEU – in other words, a CFSP legal basis – 
whenever a decision has defence implications. The Council Decision refers, in its 5th recital, 
to the structures developed under the Common Security and Defence Policy as instruments 
developed pursuant to the solidarity clause.104 Therefore, even though the solidarity clause is, 
matter-of-factly, a TFEU competence, its nature is ‘hybrid’: once again an instance in which 
rationalisation of the CFSP/TFEU distinction is hardly possible.  
EU law also offers a ‘purely’ CFSP alternative in the spirit of letter (g), the “mutual defence” 
clause of Article 42(7):  
‘If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other 
Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the 
means in their power’.  
The distinction between Articles 42(7) and 222 TFEU is not a purely political choice that 
Member States can make at their own  discretion.105 The solidarity obligations are not limited 
to those stemming from matters of mutual defence. The obligations entail prevention, 
protection, and assistance in the event such a case should present itself. Moreover, it is 
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103 “Joint proposal for a Council Decision on the arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the 
Solidarity Clause”
 
presented, pursuant to Article 222(3) TFEU, on 21
 
December 2012 by the High 
Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission.  
104 Council Decision 2014/415/EU of 24 June 2014 on the arrangements for the implementation by the Union of 
the solidarity clause. However, the Council Decision does not provide a general framework for dealing with 
actions having military defence implications, because the joint proposal excluded “defence implications”. 
105 Lonardo, supra n. 101, p. 895. 
debatable whether Article 222 TFEU could also be used to suppress social unrest (whereas 
this would certainly not be the case for 42(7) TEU).106 
 
(h) Promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and 
good global governance.  
Letter (h) sums up the previous objectives and additionally suggests a modality of diplomacy 
to go alongside them. The European Global Strategy drafted by the European External Action 
Service and presented by the High Representative in June 2016, despite not being a binding 
CFSP act, embraces this language:  European priorities ‘are best served in an international 
system based on rules and on multilateralism’.107  
However, it is the system of treaties, agreements, and cooperation established by the EU 
under both TFEU and CFSP competences, even more so than the non-binding declarations of 
the institutions,  that really serves to pursue this objective. The EU works closely with 
NATO,108 has agreements for cooperation on security and defence with other countries,109 
has developed a network of economic and political association with all its geographical 
neighbours, and either it or the collective Member States are party to all major  UN 
international treaties. 
Conclusion 
The distinction drawn in EU law between CFSP and other TFEU competences does not 
reflect the reality of international relations and diplomatic practice. This article has argued 
that, given the arbitrariness of the distinction, the drafters of the Treaties more or less 
wittingly compelled EU institutions to adopt behaviour that is awkward, uselessly 
complicated, and at times incoherent. There were both practical and historical reasons for the 
distinction: CFSP law was, at its genesis, little more than a codification of the informal 
negotiations that took place in the decades before the Treaty of Maastricht between some or 
all Member State heads of state and government. The retention of the CFSP’s legal 
distinctiveness might be a response to the Member State’s need to maintain power ‘when it 
matters’: foreign policy is a domain at the core of state functions. But, as the rationale of 
Article 21(2) TEU suggests and the analysis of institutional behaviour has shown, there are 
no objectives exclusive to CFSP. All objectives specified under the eight letters of Article 
21(2) have been used to pursue non-CFSP competences. Yet the same eight letters could have 
been CFSP objectives: as has been shown, there is a credible link between each of them and 
political or defence matters. While this is consistent with the desire to enhance the  coherence 
of Union external actions, it also adds to the difficulty in delimitating the scope of CFSP. 
The issue of boundaries is by no means specific to EU external relations law; it is a recurrent 
feature of the EU legal system and has featured prominently in the delimitation of Union and 
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Member State tasks. The Court has for decades set the boundaries of EU competences, doing 
so in internal market cases110 as well as for external relations competences.111 The same issue 
comes up in the definition of institutional power in a domain involving delicate economic and 
social choices - the Economic and Monetary Union.112 Nonetheless, the impact of the issue of 
boundaries is equally profound in the domain of Union external action. The problems 
encountered in EU attempts to manage the distinction are manifold and are quite possibly a 
hindrance to EU diplomacy.113 As a matter of efficiency, EU institution and Member State 
actions would cause them less uncertainty if they could be sure  that their actions were not at 
risk of judicial review and thus lengthy proceedings with an uncertain outcome. As a matter 
of constitutional law, the EU is compelled by the duty to ensure the consistency of its actions 
(Article 13 TEU) and in particular in its (broadly defined) foreign policy: the obligation is 
spelt out several times, in Articles 16(6), 18(4), 21(1), and 26 TEU. Finally, there is an 
underlying philosophical issue. EU law is in this case at a far remove from reality. This 
however is not necessarily a problem: law can be arbitrary, and does not always need to 
reflect practice. But in this case, it is even worse: the law strives here to impose a distinction 
that no longer makes any practical sense and therefore unnecessarily complicates the work of 
diplomats. Commentators and institutional actors alike have gone to great lengths to discover 
patterns in the case law that would solve this dilemma. This article has instead advanced the 
thesis that it would be useless - perhaps even counterproductive - to rationalise the distinction 
between CFSP and TFEU competences.  
The current article therefore does not find it necessary to propose a criterion for the 
navigation of this “self-inflicted”114 EU eccentricity. Even though it has not particularly been 
advocated here, there is, in theory, an easy way out: abolish the distinction. This would 
require a Treaty amendment and a major restructuring of the EU’s constitutional architecture. 
Ironically, this is in practice exactly what happens at European Council meetings: items are 
not categorised as falling under CFSP or TFEU competences or given any other legal label 
for that matter: they are referred to by their ‘real life’ names. It is the European Council that 
‘sets out the strategic interests and objectives of the Union in external relations’ (Article 22 
TEU), elaborating on those of Article 21(2) TEU.115 Once again, it is the institution at the 
apex of Union foreign policy whose practices show that abolishing the distinction would 
result in smoother diplomacy.  
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